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THE BAR HARBOR FIRE

As a preface to an account of the disastrous forest fire that devastated
one third of the total Bar Harbor area in October, it should be noted that at
the time of the fire no detailed record was kept of fire fighting activities.
The men of the department, along with all available assistance from out
side communities, were altogether too busy during the period of extreme
danger in an earnest attempt to bring the fire under control to give thought
to write down for future study the gigantic and, at times, urgently des
perate, efforts to stop the colossal destruction. It is a tribute to their work
that, unlike the fire fighting in other sections of the state at the time, where
confusion and divided command was a handicap, the fighting on Mount
Desert Island was exceptionally marked by a central command at all times
which coordinated all the various units in a well planned attack.

The following account of the fire is compiled from several sketchy
records that were kept, from eye witnesses’ accounts, and from data con
tributed by the Acadia National Park.
On Friday, Oct. 17, 1947 at 4:05 P.M., a call to the Fire Department
was received from Dolliver’s Dump at the Fresh Meadow which is situated
about seven miles away on the outskirts of the town in a northwesterly
direction on what is known as the Crooked Road. This dump is on the south
bank of a large meadow or bog, which in normal summer conditions, has
a heavy growth of marsh grass. The north and west borders of the bog are
marked by a fairly wide and deep stream. Upon receiving the call, a driver
was dispatched with the Dodge forest fire truck which is equipped with a 150
gallon tank of water and about 1600 feet of 1 1/2 in. hose. Upon arrival, the
driver discovered a fire which covered approximately an acre in the dried
marsh grass between 30 and 50 feet off the edge of the bog directly in front
of the dump. A line was laid from the truck and water pumped from the
tank. As we were too painfully aware, the conditions were ripe for a major
fire. We had gone several months without rain and all vegetation was de
hydrated to a point that any fire, no matter how small, could in a short time,
if not soon contained, get completely out of hand. The wind was blowing
lightly from the southwest. As soon as the supply of water in the tank had
been depleted, it was necessary for the driver to disconnect his line and go
approximately a mile away to the nearest water supply (a brook) to fill the
tank. On this trip, he notified the firehouse by phone what the situation was
and a general forest fire alarm was sounded. The chief contacted the na
tional park which sent a pumper and crew to the scene along with all avail
able men from the department. In the meantime, at the site of operations,

the Dodge truck had returned to the line and, as would be expected, under
the circumstances, the fire, unchecked during the truck’s absence, was
making progress with the wind in a northeasterly direction toward a ridge
which bordered the east side of the bog and which contained some small
soft wood growth. The men were experiencing great difficulty in dragging
the hose through the thick grass and coupled with the rapid progress of the
fire and the limited water supply, it was plain that other methods of com
bating the fire would have to be devised. It was learned from a nearby
resident that a wood road which extended through the so-called Shea Farm
on the far east of the bog, could permit a pump being taken directly to the
brook which bordered the bog on the north. It was found that this road was
already enveloped in fire and it was necessary for a pick-up truck loaded
with 1 1/2 in. hose, men and a Pacific pump to go through the fire to reach
the brook. The pump was soon spinning merrily and the crew was able to
beat down the fire to a considerable extent on the east side of the bog. Very
shortly another Pacific pump from the National Park was boosting the
water up the ridge on the east side of the bog where the most fire was con
centrated. The fire was contained at about midnight and the job of “mop
ping up” began. The little Pacific pumps were replaced by the department’s
500 gallon trailer pumper. A 2 1/2 in. line was laid and wyed off to 1 1/2 in.
so that 1 1/2 in. lines covered both the ridge on the east and the edge of the
bog on the south. From this period until midnight, Monday, Oct. 20th,
water was pumped continually and full patrols were maintained. No further
spread of the fire occurred, the edges were thoroughly wet down and what
few hot spots that could be discovered were in the bog. At midnight on
Monday the pump was shut down but the lines were kept intact around the
entire burn and with the exception of one or two hot spots in the center of
the bog, deep in the peat, all was quiet. These were in an area that had
been burned over and not considered dangerous. It is significant that these
spots never did cause further damage. The total area burned over was ap
proximately 100 acres.
At dawn, Tuesday morning Oct. 21st, a brisk wind sprang up from
the northwest and the chief with day crew were patrolling at that time.
They found the situation the same as it was the night before except that
the wind was whipping up considerable smoke from the hot spots in the
center of the bog and the pump was started. Action was taken by hose
lines to reduce activity in these hot spots. Other men were patrolling the
entire area of the burn and during this patrol, one of them reported a
spot fire that had sprung up about two hundred feet from the edge of the
burn on the southwest corner. This spot fire which was to lead directly to
our disaster, is the source of a great deal of contention, many feeling that
it was the start of a separate fire from that just described. Certainly it
started a considerable distance away from the edge of the burn which was
wet down, at an angle where it would have been impossible for a spark
from the hot spots in the center to strike and was discovered directly after
it started. There are several instances during our entire catastrophe when
incendiarism could be suspected but nothing can be proved. The chief
went immediately to the spot, discovered a fire about one hundred feet in
diameter spreading with terrifying force with the wind in the extraordinar
ily dry conditions through a thick growth of spruce and pine. He saw in
stantly the seriousness of the situation and ordered all available lines
relaid to head off the fire which was rushing ahead at an alarming rate. He
then went to the nearest telephone and called aid from all the fire depart

ments on the island and Dow Field in Bangor. Later in the day, aid was to
arrive from many more cities and towns including Bangor, Brewer, and
Camden. In the meantime, the crew at the scene could not head the fire off
for it was impossible to lay hose fast enough to reach the head of the fire.
The blaze spread rapidly through the growth of spruce and pine, booming
forty or fifty feet into the air with a roar, crossed the Crooked Road and
headed for a farm owned by Paul Russell. At this point, the department,
with the aid of re-enforcements that had arrived along the Crooked Road,
was able to save the home of Thomas Ryan which was situated on the side
of the road on the easterly edge of the fire. By now the fire was completely
out of hand and battle lines had to back up to the Norway Drive to the
southeast. By this time a large convoy of soldiers numbering about two
hundred men had sped in from Dow Field and they set up headquarters
at the Hugh Kelly farm on the Norway Drive. They were accompanied by
units of the Dow Field fire department. The soldiers were equipped to some
extent with shovels, axes, rakes and a few back tanks. They also had a
spotter plane which radioed reports of the progress of the fire to a jeep on
the ground. Because of the dry conditions, water and plenty of it was
necessary to stop the fire. A pumper was set up at the Beaver Dam brook
on the junction of the Crooked Road and Norway Drive and the water via
2 1/2 in. line was boosted up the Drive to a Park pumper which sent it along
to the crew that was attempting to stop the fire on the west side of the
Norway Drive. The woodland here was fairly well spaced with several
large pastures and chances were excellent that the fire could be kept from
jumping the Drive. However, we were to have another bit of hard luck
that was to dog us from the start to finish. The barn of Hugh Kelly on the
east side of the Drive suddenly caught fire from what was apparently a
flying ember. Eye witnesses state that a spot of fire about a foot in
diameter suddenly appeared on the roof of the barn and, in the matter of
seconds, the barn was a roaring torch with flames shooting high into the
air. The main fire at the time was at least two hundred yards away on the
west side of the Drive and we now had a two pronged fire of gigantic
proportions - one on each side of the Drive. On the east side directly in the
path of the new fire was several acres of dry slash that had lain for a
number of years from various lumbering operations. When the fire got into
that, we had a fire that was a fire. By 1:30 P.M. the first prong of the fire
extended southward through the valley of the Old Mill Brook and along
the west slope of Young’s Mountain while the second advanced southward
toward Long Heath and Sunken Heath, west of the Norway Drive. It was
thought that an attempt at extensive backfiring might be made but it in
volved too much human danger as by now a large force of men were in
the woods and water was scarce. As the afternoon wore on, it was plain
that Eagle Lake would have to be the next big stand. The wind continued
strong from the northwest and the fire marched up McFarland’s Hill and
threatened to cross the Eagle Lake Road. The main body of men and
equipment were transferred to Eagle Lake Road. The fire, under the in
fluence of the strong northwest wind, was crowning severely and despite
all efforts, did cross Eagle Lake Road at about 4 P.M. and entered national
park land west of Eagle Lake. A half hour later the flames appeared over
the crest of McFarland’s Hill. There was, by now, a heavy concentration
of men and equipment on Eagle Lake Road working under heavy smoke
conditions. The advance of the fire south of McFarland’s Hill threatened
several farm buildings and fire fighting efforts were directed in saving

them which were successful. During the night of the 21st, the fire worked
around the south end of McFarland’s Hill, through the woods between the
north end of Eagle Lake and the Eagle Lake Road, eastward as far as
Duck Brook and for a short distance across it. It also crossed the Eagle
Lake Road to the north side, swung around the north end of Brewer’s
Mountain and worked northward and eastward to Duck Brook and New
Mill’s Meadow. A pumper and large force of men with considerable hose
were employed in making a stand on the New Mill’s Meadow Road to pre
vent the fire from crossing the road. Tons of water were poured on both
banks of the road to a considerable depth all that night. It was determined
that this would be our first line of defense with How’s Park, which is in
cluded in our hydrant system, to the eastward, our secondary. About 2000
acres were burned that day.

At day break, Wednesday, October 22nd, the fire situation was as just
described. The day was clear and the wind was from the northwest, mod
erate velocity. The wind freshened as the day wore on, fanning the fire
into activity on all fronts. The national park forces at Aunt Betty’s Pond
were engaged in an effort to cut the fire off there while other forces were
seeking to stop the fire on a line running westerly from the head of New
Mill’s Meadow to Half Moon Pond and the Breakneck Drive. During the
afternoon, high officials of the National Park arrived and in conference
with Chief Sleeper, it was decided that park forces should attempt to hold
the fire in the Aunt Betty - Southwest Valley section and that they would
have full charge of fire fighting activities within the park. Meanwhile the
wind had freshened and the fire advanced rapidly southward forcing the
crew at Aunt Betty’s Pond to withdraw with their pumping equipment to
Bubble Pond. It was decided by the National Park to attempt backfiring,
which proved successful in halting the advance of the fire and by early
evening the crew was back at Aunt Betty’s Pond and resumed pumping.
About 2,250 acres burned that day.

The morning of Thursday, October 23rd, the most fateful day in
Bar Harbor history, brought with it a moderate southwest wind which
eased the situation in the Aunt Betty’s Pond sector. The fire appeared
corralled as all lines were holding well. On an airplane survey by the chief
it was found that conditions were favorable on all fronts although some
fire activity in the vicinity of Young’s Montain was causing heavy smoke.
At about 10 o’clock in the forenoon the wind increased from the southwest
to such an extent that it proved impossible to hold the line to the north on
New Mill’s Meadow, Half Moon Pond, Breakneck Drive sector. This brought
about threatening conditions to Hulls Cove and men and equipment were
rushed there to effect evacuation and prepare a defense of the position
before the fire came within reaching distance. The main part of the village
of Hulls Cove was saved though four houses were lost in the subsequent
fighting. The fire was noted here by jumping in erratic patterns.

Soon after three o’clock in the afternoon, a wind change occurred.
Without diminishing, it began to veer from southwest to west and with
increasing velocity swung into the northwest. The velocity of the wind has
been variously reported at 40, 45, 50 or more miles an hour. One report
from a reliable source has it that the Coast Guard clocked that wind at
between 63 and 70 miles an hour in Penobscot Bay just west of us at 4:00
that afternoon. No matter what the velocity, it’s a wind that anyone on

Mount Desert Island that day will never forget. It is remarkable that
many people were not burned to death for the fire, stirred to a full inferno
by the gale, descended upon the outskirts of the town of Bar Harbor,
jumping hundreds of yards at a time, sweeping all before it. Many crews
were lucky to escape with their lives. One fireman reported that he looked
up and said it looked as though two gigantic doors had opened and tower
ing columns of roaring flames shot down upon his position. He and his
crew with truck were just able to pull out even though surrounded by fire
in the matter of seconds. A preliminary warning had been issued the day
before to residents of outlaying streets of the town that preparation for
evacuation should be made and as the evacuation signal (7) was sounded
at the firehouse, all townspeople immediately proceeded to evacuate. The
sole means by land was by way of Seal Harbor via the Ocean Drive or by
the regular Route 3 road. The Army did a wonderful job loading people and
belongings into trucks, jeeps, etc. and warning of the danger to persons
who had failed to hear the evacuation signal. Many people were able to
escape by way of Seal Harbor before the fire shut off that means of escape.

It is reported that the fire crossed the Seal Harbor road at the Jackson
Laboratory at ten minutes of five and probably went over Great Head into
the ocean at around seven o’clock. Our terrain presented us with one odd
quirk in the progress of our overwhelmingly swift, fiery disaster. The in
ferno was directly west and south of us before it came into the north end
of the town proper. This can be attributed to the fact that as the roaring
flames crested over Paradise Hill in Hulls Cove, losing much of their for
ward fury on the lee side of the hill and further slowed down by the Bluffs
to the north of the town, they came into the town to the north about the
time that the main blow-up was roaring into the sea well south of the town.
The catastrophic spread and intensity of the conflagration is indicated by
the fire’s sudden enormous expansion from approximately 1900 acres at
4:00 P.M. to over 16,000 by midnight on October 23rd.

Those persons (about 2500) who failed to escape by way of the Seal
Harbor road were gathered together in the Athletic Field where it was
thought the maximum safety was to be had. However, when it became
apparent that the best means of escape would be by water, they were trans
ferred to the municipal pier and many took advantage of the shelter of
the Shore Club. Right here it must be stated that the courage of the Bar
Harbor people cannot be excelled anywhere in the world. With the bay
whipped into mountainous waves by the gale wind, with their town being
apparently obliterated at their back, with no sure certainty that any of
them would get out alive, they calmly awaited rescue without the slighest
show of panic. Calls had been made to the Coast Guard and Navy for aid
which brought immediate results. Both agencies rushed destroyers at full
steam to the harbor and the most immediate help was from lobster boats
which the Coast Guard recruited from other sections of the island. About
400 people were taken by these small boats, under difficult conditions, due
to the heavy seas, to the mainland before the road to Ellsworth was opened
on the north side of the town by fire fighter action.
As soon as it was obvious that all Hades had broken loose, when the
wind shifted to gale force into the northwest making mandatory a retreat
from Hulls Cove and outlying fronts, plans were put into operation to save
the main section of the town. The outskirts of the town had to be abandoned

to a fiery fate. Mountain Avenue, Forest Street, Eagle Lake Road, Harbor
Lane, Prospect Avenue, Brookside Avenue, Oak Street, Upper Eden Street,
were in this sphere and because of their position in relation to the fire
could not be defended. It would have been certain suicide for anyone to
have attempted any kind of a stand within their radius.
The De Gregoire Hotel at the junction of Eden and West Streets,
and the entrance to the town, was afire. It was here that the first success
ful big stand was made. A crew under the direction of the Camden and
Surry fire chiefs stopped the fire from progressing along West Street
toward the wharf where the townspeople were gathered awaiting rescue
and also stopped the fire from advancing along Eden Street toward Cottage
Street. Two big factors account for the success in stopping the fire from
wiping out the town. Firstly, the wind stayed constantly to the north or
northwest (if it had shifted but slightly to the west, the whole town would
have gone as no one could stand directly in the face of that inferno).
Secondly, Bar Harbor has a water system that is more than adequate for its
needs and which proved itself that night. Fire crews were stationed at the
De Gregoire, along Eden Street to Eden and Mount Desert Streets, at
strategic spots throughout the town. It was the job of the crews at the De
Gregoire, along Eden Street and Mt. Desert Street to stop the fire from en
tering the town. The secondary crews, within the town, wet down buildings,
protected the hospital where all patients had been quartered in the fire
proof wing, and generally looked out for fire outbreaks behind the main
points of attack.

While the crew battled at the DeGregoire, the crew at Mount Desert
and Eden under the direction of the Brewer and Bucksport chiefs was
fighting as desperately to stop the spread of the fire. A successful stand
was finally made at the junction of Mount Desert and Spring Street at
the Sampson property. Some of the horror that these men lived through
can be understood when it is stated that the Belmont Hotel, which is in
this area, was in the cellar just twenty minutes from the time it caught
afire.
In the meantime, as soon as it appeared that the firemen had stopped
the fire at the De Gregoire, a bull dozer was sent out Eden Street toward
Hulls Cove to clear whatever debris might be in the road. This was about
nine o’clock and shortly thereafter the heroic people on the wharf, led by
an army jeep, wended their way in a long caravan over this road to Ells
worth and safety.

The battle for the vital heart of Bar Harbor had now been won and
it was possible to dispatch crews to the outskirts of the town to the south
to secure whatever stands that could be made. The fire had stayed on the
east side of lower Main Street on Strawberry Hill as far as the Mount
Desert Nurseries where it had crossed the road and had gone to the sea
just south of Sol’s Cliff. A crew was set up to keep the fire within these
boundaries. The historic fire battle of Bar Harbor had reached its climax
and the gigantic job of “mopping up” was about to begin.
The morning of October 24th dawned beautifully clear and quiet as
though nature was seeking to make up for the terrible things she had done
to us the night before. The boundaries of the fire were as described in the
preceding paragraph. A strong defense was set up at Sol’s Cliff where the

fire could have been blown back into town if we were to have a southeast
wind. Crews continued to cool off the ruins in town with hoselines and
patrols began to function to put out the most dangerous “hot spots.” The
worst was over but we were still apprehensive that a new strong wind would
cause us further trouble. The Navy and Coast Guard boats arrived in the
harbor before eight o’clock and crews were immediately sent ashore with
equipment to aid in the fire fighting.

When the fire was declared officially out on November 14th by the
National Park officials and the chief, the fire had burned a total of 17,188
acres - 8,364 in the town of Bar Harbor, 74 in the town of Mount Desert
and 8,750 in National Park land. The estimated damage by valuation was
$586,125 in the National Park and $11,218,565 in the town of Bar Harbor.
Approximately 23% of all property with an assessed valuation of one and
one-half million dollars was destroyed, including 170 native homes and 67
summer cottages. Three deaths, directly or indirectly attributed to the
disaster, occurred. One, an elderly man, who had been placed aboard a
truck to be evacuated had dismounted to seek a pet, failed to get out of
the danger area and was burned to death. A young girl was fatally injured
in a truck accident during the mad rush of evacuation and a man dropped
dead at the pier before evacuation, probably due to a heart condition.
A great injustice would be done if individual heros were picked out
for special mention. In this report all names are omitted except where they
serve to establish locations. It would be impossible to relate all the out
standing acts of heroism that were performed by so many groups and in
dividuals. In a general way, it can be mentioned that the firemen who work
ed until they could work no longer by ordinary standards but who could
still find some hidden reserve to keep them going many hours after they
should have dropped, deserve praise, so do the valient women and men
who served thousands of meals at the firehouse and various canteens on
a twenty-four hour basis - plenty of good hot food was always available
under the most trying conditions - so do the hundreds of volunteers who
despite no experience in fire fighting, fought effectively and bravely at
all times, so do the army, navy, and coast guard who used a considerable
amount of valuable equipment most effectively, so do the national park
with its trained personnel especially suited to forest fire work and who did
such an excellent job of stopping the fire in the park. Special mention
should be made to the city of Ellsworth and surrounding towns which did
so much for our evacuated townspeople during their stay off the island
and the Red Cross for alleviating the suffering caused by the fire. The
police, State Police and National Guard deserve praise for handling the
evacuation.

During the most desperate part of the fire battle there was never
enough equipment to go around and one spot would have to be robbed to
serve a spot that needed it more. With the various shifts in the wind, con
stant changes had to be made in the location of equipment and personnel.
The fire house was the clearing house of all operations and was the scene
where all conferences of chiefs were held and where all plans of attack
were made. In warfare a battle, the size and scope of our fire, would have
been planned months in advance with the careful stockpiling of men and
equipment to meet all conceivable contingencies but we did not have the
opportunity of such a happy situation and were forced to improvise the

attack as we went along, keeping in mind that the locations most seriously
threatened had to have first consideration.
Besides the Bar Harbor department, there were fourteen other fire
departments actively engaged with pumpers and men in fighting the fire.
Listed alphabetically they are: Bangor, Brewer, Bucksport, Camden, Cas
tine, Dow Field Dept., Ellsworth, Northeast Harbor, Old Town, Otter
Creek, Seal Harbor, Southwest Harbor, Surry, Winter Harbor. The Na
tional Park flew in 41 of its top personnel trained in forest fire suppression
from all over the United States. The Maine Forest Fire Service was repre
sented and did much to solve problems allied to forest fire fighting. The
Army supplied hundreds of men, trucks, jeeps, bulldozers, planes, sleeping
equipment, fire fighting equipment. The Navy and Coast Guard supplied
trained fire fighters, many “Handy Billy” portable pumps, walkie talkies,
considerable hose which was flown into the Bar Harbor airport, clothing
for fire fighters. The department laid approximately 28,950 feet of 2 1/2 in.
hose and approximately 28,800 feet of 1 1/2 in. hose during the fire. This
does not include hose used by other agencies. About 1500 men fought the
fire. With the great shortage of equipment, several novel methods were
devised to combat the fire. One of the most effective was patrols on hot
spot duty. It consisted of pick-up trucks upon which were mounted 275
gallon oil tanks, such are used in home oil installation, filled with water,
several buckets and a crew of men. Such improvised fire trucks made
regular patrols of the fire area and did fine work in suppressing hos spots.
Several large oil delivery trucks of about 1000 gallon capacity equipped
with portable or sump pumps were pressed into service and did good work.

One exceptionally interesting pump hook-up was engineered by the
national park. Water was pumped to the top of Cadillac Mountain by five
500 gallon trailer pumps from Eagle Lake - a distance of three miles to a
height of 1530 feet.
Two extensive fire breaks were made during the fire by bulldozers.
One protected Town Hill and the other extended from Icy Hill to Bubble
Pond, 150 feet wide, as a protection to Seal Harbor. Neither were put to a
fire test and with wind conditions as they were, especially on October 23rd,
it is certain they would have been ineffective. Some bulldozer action was
used in the town by the chief especially where pasture land presented a
good opportunity.
This report has covered our twenty-nine square mile disaster only in
the broadest and most general terms. It would be possible to write a book
on any one of a dozen phases of the struggle if a detailed account was to
be given. Of the thousands of people who either fought the fire or escaped
from it, all of them have their interesting and, in most cases, thrilling
stories. One thing they all cannot but be impressed with and that is with
the utter helplessness mere man can possess when confronted by the full
fury of nature on the loose. It is an experience they will never forget.
Prepared by CAPT. JOHN HEATH and CHIEF DAVID A. SLEEPER,
BAR HARBOR FIRE DEPARTMENT

